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ABSTRACT 
The rise in piracy throughout the world in recent years has forced the international 
community to invest heavily in measures to counter the threat. However, these efforts 
have had little effect. Lately, the trends in Southeast Asia seem to have turned. In order to 
counter piracy efficiently, it is critical to fully understand the background and root causes 
for the phenomenon. 
Piracy is blamed by some on poverty, relative deprivation, and the lack of local 
institutions. This paper investigates piracy in the Caribbean, the Strait of Malacca, and 
Somalia, and finds that piracy is directly linked to the level of land-based governance. 
Poverty, relative deprivation, and a lack of local institutions are merely factors 
exploitable by organized pirate networks in territories with a low level of governance. By 
exploring levels of land-based governance in territories close to main shipping routes, 
possible emerging safe havens for pirates may be found. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
Piracy is both a national and a transnational threat. It follows that the 
responsibility of governing littoral territories with proximity to international shipping 
routes is also both a national and transnational challenge.1 On the national level, long 
coastlines and challenging environments have provided pirates, smugglers, and terrorists 
with relatively safe environments for their activities. Lack of internal governance and 
lack of presence of policing forces in these areas create fertile grounds for a variety of 
criminal activities.  
The rise in piracy throughout the world has forced the international community to 
invest heavily in measures to counter the threat.2 However, these efforts have had little 
effect. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), consisting of Australia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Denmark, Turkey, the U.S., and the United Kingdom, was 
established in January 2009 to counter piracy off Somalia and in the greater Gulf of Aden 
(GoA). Despite these efforts, statistics show a steady increase in the number of attacks 
worldwide and in particular in Somalia/GoA.3 In the period 2003 to 2010, the increase in 
attacks in Somalia/GoA rose from 21 to 132. The figures for January through September 
2011 show a total of 194 attacks in the same area.4 This was also true for Malaysia and 
the Strait of Malacca until 2005/2006. Lately, however, the trends in Southeast Asia seem 
to have turned.5 In order to counter piracy efficiently, it is important to fully understand 
the background and root causes for the phenomenon. This paper uses the comparative 
                                                 
1 Eduardo Ma R Santos. “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Philippines,” in Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, (Leiden, 
International Institute for Asian Studies, 2006),  37–52. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), CDefinitions of Piracy, Article 101,” 
1982. 
3 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and remedies,” 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, October 2009, 
http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf (accessed 22 March 
2011),  1–18. 
4 “2010 Annual IMB Piracy Report,” International Maritime Bureau, January 2011. 
5 “2010 Annual IMB Piracy Report.” International Maritime Bureau, January 2011. 
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method to investigate the possible factors that lead to the growth and existence of piracy. 
It also employs case studies to investigate lack of governance as a possible cause of 
piracy. The study will also show the lack of correlation between poverty and piracy. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Piracy is as old as maritime trade. Early records show the existence of piracy in 
the Aegean and Mediterranean as early as the 13th century BC.6 Ancient Illyrians, 
Tyrrhenians, Greeks, and Romans were known to be pirates.7 A variety of documentation 
has shown various levels of piracy at sea throughout ancient history in the Atlantic, the 
Aegean and Mediterranean, and the Pacific. The Vikings, possibly the most infamous 
pirates in history, raided large parts of Europe and Russia, and went as far as North 
Africa and Persia on their raids.8 Toward the end of the 9th century, Muslim pirates had 
established havens along the coast of southern France and northern Italy.9 In the 14th 
century, the Venetian Duke of Crete was forced to put the Venetian fleet on constant 
guard against Muslim pirates.10 In 1523, Jean Fleury seized two Spanish treasure ships 
carrying Aztec treasures from Mexico to Spain, thus initiating what would later be known 
as the “golden age” of piracy.11 In the century after 1650, pirates raided the Caribbean 
waters and the waters off the American colonies. This was the era of the legendary pirates 
Henry Morgan, Blackbeard, and William Kidd.12 Piracy declined at a steady pace after 
                                                 
6 “The Pirates Hold: Piracy Timeline,” (n.d.), http://pirateshold.buccaneersoft.com/pirate-
timeline.html, under “Piracy Timeline,” (accessed 13 May 2011). 
7 “Phoenician Economy and Trade,” (n.d.), 
http://www.reocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/2587/trade.html, under “Phoenician Economy and Trade,” 
(accessed 13 May 2011). 
8 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “Norman,” (n.d.),  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/418283/Norman, under “Norman” (accessed 31 October 
2011). 
9Robert W. Lebling, Jr, “The Pirates of St. Tropez,” 25 October 2009, 
http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/athens/troy/4040/pirates.htm&date=2009-
10-25+12:56:07 (accessed 13 May 2011). 
10 “Piracy on Crete,” Creta News, 2008, 
http://www.cretanews.com/site/index.php?page=art&article=104&lang=  (accessed 13 May 2011). 
11Alfred A. Knopf,  “Spanish Claim to All Land in New World,” (n.d), 
http://www.bio.umass.edu/biology/conn.river/claim.html (accessed 13 May 2011). 
12 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Piracy,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/461493/piracy under “Piracy,” (accessed 31 October 2011). 
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1730, and in the 19th century the activity was at an historic low. This situation was to 
continue well into the 20th century, when what has been labeled the era of “modern 
piracy” emerged. In the final decades of the 20th century, piracy reemerged in its current 
form in Southeast Asia and East Africa in particular.13 
Historically, piracy has been related to maritime commerce.14 However, a 
common source of piracy has also been the privateer commissioned by a government to 
make reprisals, conduct law enforcement operations, or prey upon the enemy in war-
time.15 The privateer was traditionally offered a share of the loot from captured vessels. 
Privateering was a highly profitable business, and after a given war this lucrative business 
would often mutate into piracy. The only difference between the two was that 
privateering was a legal, state-sanctioned activity, and piracy was the same activity 
conducted without governmental consent.16 Historically, privateers have been actively 
engaged by various states to harass rivals and enforce policies on the seas. Also, time and 
again, the privateers have turned to piracy when the need for their services declined.17 As 
in the Caribbean in earlier times, privateers have been utilized for territorial control in 
Southeast Asia and East Africa in the 20th century.18  
Malaysian waters played a key role in political power struggles among powers in 
Southeast Asia. Supported by colonial powers such as the Portuguese, Dutch and the 
British, pirate crews of the Orang Laut people helped protect Malaysian waters against 
                                                 
13 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Piracy,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/461493/piracy under “Piracy,” (accessed 31 October 2011). 
14 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Piracy,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/461493/piracy under “Piracy,” (accessed 31 October 2011). 
15 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Piracy,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/461493/piracy under “Piracy,” (accessed 31 October 2011). 
16 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Piracy,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/461493/piracy under “Piracy,” (accessed 31 October 2011). 
17 Colin Woodard, The Republic of Pirates, (Harcourt, Inc., New York, 2007),   1–6. 
18 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and remedies,” 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, October 2009, 
http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf (accessed 22 March 
2011),  8. 
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expansion attempts from neighboring countries.19 These crews were disbanded when the 
colonizers decided to exploit the resources available in the Southeast Asian colonies. Out 
of the disbanded privateers and the increased commercial traffic through the Strait of 
Malacca grew a new and lucrative trade: piracy.20 In an effort to rid the area of piracy in 
the 19th century, the British and the Dutch drew a demarcation line along the Strait of 
Malacca, established spheres of control, and started a unified effort to battle the pirates. 
By the 1870s, stability was achieved.21 The situation was to remain calm until the 
liberation of the colonies, when political instability, internal disputes and lack of 
governance reemerged in the region.22 Lately, unified efforts by the nations surrounding 
the Strait of Malacca have led to a decrease in pirate attacks. These efforts have been 
implemented to increase governance and enforce the rule of law at sea by the utilization 
of modern technology.23 
East Africa experienced a rapid growth in piracy following the end of the Cold 
War. In Somalia, a rapidly deteriorating stability situation led to that nation’s total 
collapse in 1991.24 Somalia’s proximity to one of the world’s busiest routes of maritime 
trade combined with an absence of rule of law, lack of infrastructure and governance, and 
internal violence has made the country a safe haven for pirates and the Al Shabaab 
Islamist group.25 Although there is debate about the root causes for piracy off the coast of 
Somalia, there are signs of links to self-proclaimed privateers that took upon themselves 
the task of enforcing Somali laws and protecting national maritime resources from illegal 
                                                 
19 Charles Corn, “The Scents of Eden: A Narrative of the Spice Trade” (New York: Kodansha 
America, Inc., 2009),  3–14. 
20 Charles Corn, “The Scents of Eden: A Narrative of the Spice Trade” (New York: Kodansha 
America, Inc.,  2009),  231–242. 
21 Charles Corn, “The Scents of Eden: A Narrative of the Spice Trade” (New York: Kodansha 
America, Inc.,  2009),  307–320. 
22 Mark T. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization, (London: 
RuthledgeCurzon, 2004),  37–55. 
23 2010 Annual IMB Piracy Report,” International Maritime Bureau, January 2011. 
24 “Country Profile: Somalia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 1 January 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm (accessed 31 October 2011). 
25 “Country Profile: Somalia,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 1 January 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm (accessed 31 October 2011). 
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foreign exploitation.26 Lack of governance on shore made weapons and safe havens 
accessible to the growing trade of piracy.27 
Various theories have been posited in order to explain the decline of piracy in the 
18th century. One theory is that the decline of piracy was caused by military campaigns 
directed towards the pirates, their ships, and their safe havens. The most important 
shortcoming of the theory is the failure to explain why piracy more or less ceased to exist 
for 300 years following these campaigns, despite various shifts in military power 
throughout the world during the same period. Military campaigns as an explanation for 
the decline of piracy immediately after the Golden Age cannot account for the 300-year 
gap in piracy following these campaigns. 
Southeast Asia was the main focus area for research on piracy prior to 2005 
because that is where piracy was most prevalent at the time. However, the focus on 
piracy shifted toward Somalia as piracy off the Horn of Africa increased. Both Somalia 
and the Strait of Malacca lie along the main trading route between Europe and Asia. The 
rise in piracy in both areas has had widespread political and financial effects.28 As a 
result, modern piracy research has been focused mainly on these two areas. 
Toward the end of the 20th century, the Strait of Malacca had gained the 
reputation of being the most pirate-infested area in the world. The rise in piracy in 
Southeast Asia is commonly seen as a result of economic crisis/poverty and political 
instability. The most common argument is that the Asian financial crisis put significant 
numbers of the populations out of work, and created a need for alternative sources of 
income.29 Political instability in Indonesia is another prevalent explanation for the 
increased rate of piracy in Southeast Asia in the late 1990s. Recent literature points 
                                                 
26 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia,” African Loft, 13 April 2009, http://africanloft.com (accessed 
03 November 2011). 
27 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia,” African Loft, 13 April 2009, http://africanloft.com (accessed 
03 November 2011). 
28 James Jay Carafano, Richard Weitz and Martin Edwin Andersen, “Maritime Security: Fighting 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” Heritage Special Report, 24 June 2009, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0059.cfm (accessed 02 May 2012). 
29 David Rosenberg, “The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea,” Naval War College 
review, Summer 2009, 62:3, 46. 
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toward the poorly governed province of Aceh as a safe haven for Asian pirates at the turn 
of the millennium.30 Political instability and lack of governance provide pirates with safe 
havens and the possibility to acquire weapons.31 
There is, however, debate in the literature about the relationship between 
economic decline/poverty, instability/governance, and piracy in Somalia. One school of 
thought argues that the collapse of Somalia in 1991 created lawlessness both on land and 
at sea.32 Local accounts explain the growth in piracy off the coast of Somalia as a result 
of disenfranchised Somali fishermen.33 The fishermen took up arms to chase foreign 
fishing vessels out of Somali waters and reclaim their resources. These modern self-
proclaimed privateers are viewed as the precursor to the contemporary pirate networks in 
Somalia.34 Stig Jarle Hansen argues that piracy is a result of a lack of local institutions 
rather than the lack of a functioning state.35 However, there is little empirical data that 
supports a connection between poverty and piracy. This thesis argues that poverty in 
itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause piracy. Also, this paper intends to show 
that the level of piracy, and the effectiveness of local institutions, is closely linked to the 
level of central governance executed by a functioning state. 
Piracy can theoretically occur anywhere in the world with a proximity to shipping 
lanes. However, specific conditions are required for piracy to occur and grow. This thesis 
intends to test governance and poverty against the growth and existence of piracy. This 
                                                 
30 Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: a Problem Solved?” 
Naval War College review, summer 2009, 62:3, 37. 
31 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report.” International Maritime Bureau, January 2010. 
32 Brett Schaeffer,  “Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia’s Deeper Problems,” The Heritage Foundation, 
17 April 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/africa/wm2398.cfm (Accessed 02 May 2012). 
33 Katie Stuhldreher, “To turn the tide on piracy in Somalia, bring justice to its fisheries,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 20 November 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1120/p09s01-
coop.html (accessed 02 May 2012). 
34 “There are Two Piracies in Somalia,” African Loft, 13 April 2009, http://africanloft.com (accessed 
03 November 2011). 
35 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and remedies,” 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, October 2009, 
http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf (accessed 22 March 
2011),  62–63. 
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study divides governance into two separate variables: land-based governance and 
maritime governance. The variables are listed as follows: 
 Land-based governance.36 Pirate networks benefit from instability, 
conflict, and failure of government institutions. Instability, lack of law and 
order, and internal conflicts or unrest are factors that benefit criminal 
enterprises and thus piracy. Weak governance results in a lack of security 
and weak local institutions, and enables pirates or criminals to exploit 
these weaknesses through extortion or corruption. Also, strong land-based 
governance denies pirates their safe havens, increases the risk of 
prosecution, and makes recruitment, corruption and coercion of local 
institutions a challenging task. 
 Maritime governance.37 Effective enforcement of the legal framework in 
international waters is a function of land-based governance. A strong land-
based government is able to extend its influence beyond its territorial 
waters and prevent the growth and existence of piracy. Pirates gravitate 
towards ungoverned or disputed areas in order to benefit from a lack of 
government presence and to access their targets. 
 Poverty. A high level of poverty among populations causes exploitation of 
new sources of income. Also, poor populations are exploitable by criminal 
networks and thus by pirates. Poverty on a state-level creates a lower 
financial growth rate, higher levels of instability, lower government 
legitimacy, and lower ability to fund governing institutions. 
The variations in governance and poverty, and the rise and fall in maritime piracy 
in the Caribbean, the Strait of Malacca, and Somalia, suggest a possible link between 
these three variables and piracy. Some have identified these links, but a clear and 
unequivocal relationship is not established. Whether there is a correlation between the 
three variables and piracy, and whether central or local governance is more important, is 
the gap this thesis intends to fill. 
                                                 
36 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Governance,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/thesaurus?query=governance under “Governance” (accessed 10 February 
2012): The definition of governance in this paper: “lawful control over the affairs of a political unit (as a 
nation).” 
37 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Governance,” (n.d.), 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/thesaurus?query=governance under “Governance” (accessed 10 February 
2012) 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following chapters examine piracy in the Caribbean, the Strait of Malacca, 
and Somalia. Using the two primary conditions, land-based governance and maritime 
governance, for the growth of piracy as a framework, they will demonstrate how those 
conditions contributed to the expansion of pirate activities, and how neutralizing their 
effect caused a decline in piracy. This study intends to answer the following questions: 
 How does land-based governance influence piracy? 
 How does maritime governance influence piracy? 
 How does poverty influence piracy? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This paper researches historical piracy both from the 17th and 18th centuries, and 
recent piracy from 1985 to 2011, in order to examine how well the proposed factors fit 
empirical data related to each case study.  
The International Maritime Bureau is a trustworthy provider of contemporary data 
on pirate activity.38 IMB has issued annual piracy threat report and analyses since 1992. 
The IMB annual piracy reports contain number of attacks, attempted attacks, types of 
vessels attacked, and positions of attacks. Generally, the IMB definition of piracy is 
considered better than the definition given in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS).39 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) generally 
provides the most reliable information on modern piracy prior to 1992 in its “Anti-
Shipping Activity Messages” (ASAM).40 Historical notes are utilized to measure levels 
of piracy during the 17th and 18th centuries. Possibly the most extensive work on the 
golden age of piracy, The Republic of Pirates by Colin Woodard, is used in order to 
                                                 
38 ICC Commercial Crime Services, http://www.jcc-ccs.org (n.d.), (accessed 10 February 2012).  
39 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and remedies,” 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, October 2009, 
http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf (accessed 22 March 
2011),  5–6. 
40 FAS produced yearly ASAM reports between 1985 and 1999. Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pirates.htm (accessed 10 February 2012).  
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document the growth and extent of piracy in the Caribbean. Also, Woodard’s book, 
drawing on actual log books from the British Royal Navy in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
provides a clear picture of countermeasures, and how colonial governance was 
reestablished both on land and in the Atlantic Ocean.41 
Piracy is usually measured in number of attacks. However, for the historical part 
of this paper, values of captured cargoes and the number of ships attacked are utilized in 
order to provide a more precise account of the piracy problem. The level of maritime 
governance is measured in number of ships, soldiers, and weaponry, as well as the 
strategy used to stop piracy. In order to measure land-based governance, historical notes 
combined with facts retrieved from contemporary research are utilized. Worth noting is 
that most nationally gathered data on Somalia are highly unreliable. This is in itself a sign 
of a profound lack of internal governance. This paper utilizes qualitative assessments 
from articles and reports where data from scientific sources are not available, especially 
for piracy in the Caribbean. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis analyzes variations in piracy in various geographic areas during 
various time frames to determine common variables present in the chosen theoretical 
population. The first time frame, discussed in Chapter II, covers piracy in the Golden 
Age, from approximately 1650 to 1730. Chapter III looks at the growth of modern piracy 
in Southeast Asia, specifically the Strait of Malacca from 1985 to 2011, while Chapter IV 
analyzes the growth of piracy in GoA from 2003 to 2011. Chapter V summarizes the 
findings of this study. 
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II. CARIBBEAN: THE GOLDEN AGE OF PIRACY 
 
Figure 1.   The Caribbean Sea (From: Wikipedia, 2011) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From approximately 1650 to 1720, thousands of pirates roamed the Caribbean 
waters. The period of the late 17th and early 18th centuries is often referred to as the 
“Golden Age” of piracy, and gave fame to pirates including Blackbeard (Edward Thatch), 
Henry Morgan, William “Captain” Kidd, Jack Rackham, and Bartholomew Roberts.42 
The widespread piracy in the Caribbean continued to grow uncontrolled until a 
coordinated government campaign finally put an end to the activity in the 18th century. 
                                                 
42 Royal Museums Greenwich: National Maritime Museum, “Pirates: Ships, Seafarers & Life at Sea: 
Sea & Ships Fact Files,” 2005,  http://www.rmg.co.uk/essplore/sea-and-ships/facts/ships-and-
seafarers/pirates (accessed 30 March 2011). 
 12
B. BACKGROUND 
Piracy in the West Indies emerged in the 16th century, set in motion by the 
discoveries of Christopher Columbus. During his search for a quicker trade route from 
Europe to the East, Columbus had established contact between the European continent 
and the lands later named America at the end of the 15th century. Columbus was working 
for the Spanish monarchy, and the newly discovered lands were claimed by Spain. These 
new Spanish colonies were rich in silver, gold, and gems and the increased Spanish 
looting of these lands led to a surge of settlers both on the American mainland and on a 
number of Caribbean islands.  
Long European wars between England, France and Spain had brought the Spanish 
empire to its knees financially. In order to bring much needed wealth back to Spain, large 
galleons began to bring valuable cargoes from America back to Europe.43 These galleons 
were irresistible targets for pirates. Among the first was the French privateer Jean Fleury, 
who in 1523 captured two Spanish treasure ships containing gold, jewels, and other Aztec 
valuables. Fleury seized 62,000 ducats of gold, 600 marks of pearls (approximately 140 
kilograms), and several tons of sugar. By the 1530s, approximately 30 European pirate 
ships operated in the Caribbean.44 Within a relatively short time frame, these pirate 
attacks forced the Spanish to sail their galleons between America and Spain in fleets with 
armed vessels for protection. 
The “Golden Age of Piracy” is a modern term. Historians have argued over the 
duration of the period. Nevertheless, there is broad consensus that the period between 
1650 and 1720, as defined by the historian John Fiske in 1897, saw an upsurge in piracy 
unprecedented in history.45  
Piracy mirrored the 17th century European conflicts over trade. The Caribbean 
was a center of European trade and colonization and the rival countries, including the 
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empires of Great Britain, Spain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands, brought war on a 
smaller scale to the Caribbean colonies. As a result, smuggling increased as did piracy 
and privateering throughout the Caribbean.46 In the years between 1588 and 1603, 
English sailors organized 100 to 200 pirate raids each year and brought back an annual 
booty of £150,000 to £300,000.47 
The outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618 led to a fast decline in Spanish 
presence in the Caribbean. The colonies became increasingly dependent on African slave 
labor, and had to manage with a steady decrease in Spanish governance and military 
presence. In this environment, the English expanded their influence and gained control 
over St. Kitts, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and Bermuda. The French also consolidated 
their presence and gained control over Guadeloupe, Hispaniola, and Martinique. They 
also held nominal sway over Tortuga, later to become a pirate safe haven. The Dutch 
began to develop from a pure trading partner in the region into a colonial power and 
seized Curacao and St. Eustatius.48 
Throughout the 17th century, the Caribbean became a safe haven for pirates and 
privateers. What had started out as a proxy army for the various colonial powers 
developed into a formidable army of pirates. In 1657, the governor of Jamaica felt 
threatened by the continued Spanish attacks and invited the entire English pirate 
population of Tortuga to move to Jamaica in an effort to reinforce the island’s defenses. 
By 1665, more than 2,000 pirates operated out of Port Royal, Jamaica.49 During the  
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second half of the 17th century, Jamaica’s economy was almost entirely dependent on 
piracy. The booty provided by the pirates financed taverns, gambling houses, naval 
stores, weapons, and ammunition.50  
In 1657, Captain Christopher Myngs, commander of the 44-gun frigate “Marston 
Moor” attacked the Venezuelan towns of Cumana, Puerto Caballos, and Coro with a total 
take of £200,000-£300,000. Myngs was eventually sent to England for prosecution, but 
was set free and returned in 1662 with the 34-gun frigate “Centurion” to continue his 
pirate operations. In 1662, he attacked Santiago, Cuba, and captured six ships and a 
significant amount of treasure. In 1663, Myngs attacked the town of San Francisco in the 
Bay of Campeche supported by 1,500 British pirates in 12 ships. He captured 14 Spanish 
ships and robbed the citizens of 150,000 pesos.51 
Henry Morgan, another famous pirate captain, was never legally labeled a pirate 
due to his commission from the governor of Jamaica. However, in 1663-1664 he, 
together with John Morris, raided the coast of Central America. During this period, they 
plundered three Spanish cities, and by 1668 Morgan was elected admiral of the Jamaican 
privateers.52 In 1668, Morgan led 700 English and French buccaneers in 12 ships against 
Puerto Principe, Cuba. The outcome was relatively small, since the Cubans had fled. 
However, the remaining citizens were looted of 50,000 pesos. Captain Morgan continued 
to attack Portobello, the collection point of Spanish treasure in Panama, with his 
remaining 500 pirates. He captured the city, three forts, and about 100,000 pesos. He had 
not been commissioned to conduct land operations. However, the amount of plunder that 
was brought back to Jamaica seemed to have lessened the governor’s reactions to his 
non-commissioned operations.53 In April 1669, Morgan led an attack against Maracaibo 
and Gibraltar in Venezuela with a total loot of 125,000 pesos. Captain Morgan’s most 
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successful campaign was, perhaps, the attack on Panama in 1671.  The city was raided by 
a force of approximately 2,000 pirates and 33 ships. Reports indicate that 400 Spanish 
soldiers were killed in the raid that led to a 3-week capture of Panama. It took 200 pack 
mules to bring the plunder from the city back to the pirates’ ships. During the same raid, 
Providence Island and the Spanish fort San Lorenzo were also captured.54 
Throughout the 17 century, French and Dutch pirates were also active. The Dutch 
pirate Piet Heyn captured an entire Spanish fleet in Matanzas Bay in 1628. Heyn escaped 
with loot valued at approximately 12 million guilders or 4.8 million pesos. French pirates 
mainly worked out of Tortuga. The French pirate Francois l’Olonais was a particularly 
brutal criminal, and reportedly decapitated 87 Spanish prisoners in revenge for 
mistreatment of his crew. L’Olonais plundered Gibraltar and Maracaibo in Venezuela in 
1667 with a total haul of 30,000 pesos and 500 cattle. 
Towards the end of the 17 century, conditions in the colonies changed. The 
signing of the Treaty of Madrid in July 1670 acknowledged England’s right to the New 
World colonies. The financial importance of the colonies grew and the adverse economic 
effects of piracy became more apparent. The number of privateers had increased but the 
more peaceful situation in Europe led to an increasing presence, especially by the British 
navy, in the colonies. England agreed to enforce the peace settlement with Spain as a part 
of the Treaty of Madrid. However, the extremely profitable business of privateering 
proved difficult to stop. Instead of stopping, the privateers turned to piracy and continued 
their quest for wealth.55 
The new generation of pirates consisted of sailors, indentured servants, and 
runaway slaves rebelling against captains, ship owners, and the owners of the great slave 
plantations of America and the West Indies.56 Arguably, profit was a main driving force 
behind piracy. However, the egalitarian system among the pirates combined with the 
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general dissatisfaction aboard merchant vessels, on the slave plantations, and aboard 
naval ships, caused defections and fueled the pirates’ expansion. In 1718, the growing 
number of runaway slaves caused major concerns to the governor of Bermuda.57 
The uncontrolled growth and the success of the pirates caused large problems for 
the colonial powers. Around 1720, the pirates were so powerful that the twenty-two-gun 
frigate HMS Seaford assigned to protect the Leeward Islands was at risk of being 
overpowered. Between 1717 and 1720, the pirates threatened not only the small naval 
detachment in the Caribbean, but also posed a threat to entire colonies and repeatedly 
blockaded South Carolina.58 The realization in Europe that the Caribbean had turned into 
a “Pirates Republic” eventually provoked a reaction. As a result, the British Crown sent 
Woodes Rogers, a former privateer and war hero to confront the pirates and pacify the 
Bahamas. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Land-based Governance 
The Caribbean colonies were initially largely autonomous entities. These entities 
were ruled by a variety of governors and noblemen from the European continent and the 
various government institutions they established largely reflected those of their respective 
home countries.59 These regional governments were expected to administer production, 
provide basic services to the populations, and control law and order. The various local 
governments survived by taxing, and thanks to sporadic supplies from Europe.60 
Privateers were depended on to help maintain law and order, and to extend the European 
wars to the colonies. “The cost of maintaining a fleet to defend the colonies was beyond 
the ability of national governments of the 16th and 17th centuries. Thus, private vessels 
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would be commissioned into a “navy” with a letter of marque, paid with a substantial 
share of whatever they could capture from enemy ships and settlements, the rest going to 
the crown.”61 The privateers were based in various colonial cities and generated much-
needed supplies in the form of contraband taken from captured merchant ships.  
As the European wars drew to an end in the early 18th century, private law 
enforcement was banned. European countries deployed naval ships to the region in order 
to maintain control over their increasingly important colonies. However, in the brief 
period between the peace agreements and the deployment of naval ships to the Caribbean, 
piracy spiraled out of control. Local governments were unable to prevent pirate attacks. 
Also, these governments had become complicit in the trade. With a near-total lack of 
military presence and central governance, the deterrent for the pirates was absent. This 
lack of government presence offered possibilities for opportunistic and now criminal 
privateers to maintain the lucrative piracy trade throughout the Caribbean islands, and 
along the coast of America.62  
The pirates grew in numbers and in strength, and by 1717 an estimated 2,400 
pirates were operating in the Caribbean.63 They threatened not only ships, but entire 
colonies.64 During the late summer of 1717, Edward Teach (aka Edward Thatch or 
Blackbeard) captured more than 15 commercial vessels during a 2-week period.65 
The intervention by the British around 1720 did little to stop the pirate’s activity. 
Their intervention was little more than a nuisance to the pirates. For instance, the number 
and strength of the Caribbean pirates caused great concern to the HMS Phoenix deployed 
to the Bahamas in 1718. A number of her crew defected and joined the pirates. Also, the 
twenty-two-gun frigate assigned to protect the Leeward Islands, the HMS Seaford, found 
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itself in danger of being overpowered. The pirates had become so powerful they occupied 
British territory in the Leeward Islands, threatened to invade Bermuda, and ran successful 
blockades of South Carolina.66  
Arguably, the initial British intervention suffered from a gross underestimation of 
the strength and number of pirates operating throughout the Atlantic Ocean, and failed to 
address the real problem in the colonies: the absence of central or controlled and 
coordinated British governance. Local institutions were functioning well in the Caribbean 
colonies. However, taxation and rule of law were upheld by the pirates themselves in 
direct competition with a weak English government. The Caribbean colonies were 
internationally recognized as de jure possessions of the various colonial empires. 
However, de facto sovereignty and land-based governance were necessary to stop piracy 
in the region. 
England had started its campaign to counter the Caribbean pirates in the 1670s. In 
1671, the corrupt governor of Jamaica, Sir Thomas Modyford, was arrested, sent to 
England for prosecution, and replaced by Sir Thomas Lynch. Modyford received a 
sentence of two years’ imprisonment. In an attempt to stop piracy, Thomas Lynch offered 
the pirates pardons and 35 acres of land. The same strategy was attempted in 1688, 1701, 
and in 1717.67 However, with no means of deterrence or no stick to go along with this 
carrot, the offers did not stop the piracy trade. In 1717, the offer of pardons was followed 
by a threat. A bounty was placed on the heads of pirates refusing to seek pardons. A price 
of £100 was offered for the capture of a pirate captain, and £20 for crew members. At the 
time, a captain’s annual salary was only approximately £65.68 
By the late 17th century, piracy had grown into a trans-national problem. Attacks 
occurred throughout the Atlantic Ocean, from the American coast in the west to the 
European continent in the east. The economies of British and Spanish America and the 
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colonial powers of the Caribbean were seriously affected by piracy. The impact of piracy 
on the colonial economies slowly turned public sentiment from support of the pirates 
towards direct opposition. Jamaica slowly regained territorial control and law and order. 
A continued focus on piracy countermeasures and stricter enforcement of the law 
increased the Jamaican merchants’ reluctance to trade with pirates.69 Prohibitions against 
letters of marque combined with the Piracy Act of 1699 further added to the pressure on 
pirates and collaborators. Admiralty Courts were set up in the American colonies, further 
deterring people from venturing into piracy.70 
Although countermeasures were implemented in the second half of the 17th 
century, piracy was far from extinct. The Nine Years War from 1688 to 1697, and the 
War of the Spanish Succession from 1701 to 1713, still saw letters of marque being 
provided to pirates, thus prolonging the piracy problem in the Atlantic Ocean. Also, 
France did not have an agreement with Spain, and continued its attacks on Spanish ships 
until approximately 1700.71 
The general lack of coherent central governance throughout the colonies 
continued to facilitate piracy. The Bahamas was privately owned and sold letters of 
marque to privateers for profit. Those sparsely populated islands did not offer a profitable 
market for plunder, but emerged as a safe haven for colonial American smugglers 
instead.72 
America’s thirteen colonies also emerged as safe havens for pirates. South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island were all known as safe havens. As a result of the 
increased taxes imposed on the American colonies by the Navigation Acts, a prospering 
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market for stolen goods emerged. Turbulence within the American colonies also 
facilitated financing of piracy, corruption, and large profits from the piracy trade.73 
The near total lack of central governance throughout the American colonies led to 
extensive public involvement in piracy. Pirates contributed significantly to the economy 
of the colonies and New York allegedly received contributions estimated at around 
£100,000 annually during this period. American governors sold protection for £100 per 
man, and pirates who received sentences in the American colonies could avoid hanging 
by paying £13.74 
With peace in Europe and the growing importance of the colonies during the first 
two decades of the 17 century, trans-national agreements to end piracy emerged. National 
armies were brought under royal control, and the mission of governing national territory 
was extended to the Caribbean in the late 1600s.75 In 1696, the ship “Fancy” arrived in 
the Bahamas and offered to pay the proprietary governor, Nicholas Trott, £2,000 to 
offload cargo. The captain of the “Fancy” was Henry Bridgeman (aka John Avery). 
Avery had pirated an Indian vessel with a value estimated at £150,000. A £1,500 bounty 
was placed on his and his crew’s heads for the attack. Trott accepted Avery’s somewhat 
large bribe. However, as a result of the increased pressure from the English throne, Avery 
soon had to leave the Bahamas.  
As Avery’s example illustrates, the pirates were running out of safe havens, and 
left little choice but to spread out and disappear. Some fled to the American colonies 
never to be seen again, and some escaped back to Ireland. Seven of Avery’s crew were 
apprehended and five were hanged in England. Although some crew members were 
executed, only the seven out of a crew of 94 were apprehended.  
More aggressive English countermeasures and political changes in the form of 
naval intervention and the installment of trustworthy officials finally led to a decrease in 
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piracy in the Caribbean. Establishment of Admiralty Courts made prosecution easier, and 
populations in the growing colonies continued to turn against the pirates. The first pirate 
to suffer the effects of increased governance and harsher counter-measures was William 
Kidd. Convicted of piracy, he was hanged in London in 1701, and others followed. 
Blackbeard or Edward Thatch was killed in 1718, and 13 of his crew members were later 
hanged. Stede Bonnet and 29 of his crew were hanged76; Bartholomew Roberts was 
killed in 1722 and of his crew, 54 were executed, 37 were sentenced to forced labor, 74 
were acquitted, and 70 black slaves were given up as slaves.77 In 1722, 41 Spanish 
pirates were executed; and in 1723 captain Finn and Edward Lowe’s ships were captured 
and a total of 32 pirates were executed. All told, between 1719 and 1722 an estimated 
500 to 600 pirates were captured and executed.78  
The extension of territorial control expanded to the American coast in the 1710s 
and east to the Indian Ocean in the 1720s.79 An estimated 2,000-5,000 pirates were active 
in the Caribbean colonies between 1716 and 1718; by 1726, the pirate population was 
down to about 200 individuals.80 As we have seen, this resulted from a change in the 
political climate in Europe and in the American colonies combined with new legislations 
that slowly removed safe havens in the Caribbean. Deprived of safe ports to rest and refit, 
without markets for stolen goods, and in the advent of more effective courts and 
extensive executions, piracy was on the decline. By the late 1720s piracy was largely  
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extinct in the Caribbean: “The famous pirates of the early 18th century were a completely 
illegal remnant of a golden buccaneering age, and they could expect no more than 
eventual capture.”81  
2. Maritime Governance 
Pirates have plagued seafarers for millennia. What might surprise most readers is 
that a legal framework in international waters has been present for centuries. However, 
this framework is at best weak. Also, it has always been based on enforcement by 
functioning nation-states. Similarly, law enforcement within a sovereign nation’s 
territorial waters has been left to the nation’s law enforcement agencies. Piracy within a 
nation’s territory, however, is not covered by the conventions and laws of international 
waters, and is often referred to as armed robbery or sea robbery.82  
The legal framework that existed for international waters in the 17th century was, 
as it is today, incomplete. Enforcement in an increasingly interconnected and 
industrializing world was increasingly dependent on regional cooperation between 
functioning nation-states. During the “Golden Age of Piracy” the rather weak “freedom 
of the seas” concept created the basis for law enforcement in international waters. It is 
worth mentioning that the freedom of travel on the seas has always, and still is, a stronger 
principle than law enforcement on the oceans. During the 18th century, technological 
developments led to a revision of how much of the adjacent oceans could be considered 
to be under the jurisdiction of a nation. The cannon-shot rule was accepted as a measure 
of jurisdiction and set forth that a nation controlled territorial waters out to the distance of 
a projectile fired from a cannon based on shore. In the 18th century, this range was 
approximately three nautical miles.83 
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The increase in trade and inter-dependency among nations also increased the 
impact of piracy on world trade.84 The Caribbean colonies lacked the means to counter 
the emerging piracy threat. Not until a new approach of collaboration was adopted did the 
European nations effectively stop the pirates in the Caribbean. Trans-national cooperation 
ensured a heightened level of security for the increasing international trade and violent 
retribution functioned as an effective deterrent.  
Law enforcement in international waters in an increasingly interconnected world 
has depended on regional cooperation for centuries.85 The weak governments of the 
Caribbean colonies initially lacked the will, the levels of governance, and the internal 
means of law enforcement to cooperate and cope with the piracy problem. Only in 1718, 
when the British Crown sent Woodes Rogers, a seasoned privateer from the British war 
with France and a celebrated hero of the British navy, to brutally crack down on the 
piracy trade did the “Golden Age of Piracy” finally come to an end. This was nearly five 
decades after the struggle to remove Caribbean piracy began. 
Prior to the 1670s, English warships were rarely seen in the Caribbean. However, 
as the piracy problem increased, so did the navy’s presence. During the 1670s, Jamaica 
received two frigates, one frigate was stationed in Barbados, and the Leeward Islands got 
one ketch. At this early stage of the counter-piracy campaign, no ships were assigned to 
the British American colonies apart from two naval ships off the coast of Newfoundland 
to protect the fisheries in the region. In the 1680s, the naval presence further increased as 
piracy worsened. Jamaica received a total number of four frigates, Leeward three, and the 
American colonies two ships in Chesapeake Bay and one in Boston.86 While the presence 
of these ships caused some pirates to venture east towards the Indian Ocean, the 
limitations of such a small naval presence were obvious, and the risks of being caught 
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remained low. As a result, the opportunity to acquire wealth by piracy far outweighed the 
risks of capture and prosecution, and piracy continued to thrive. 
This changed with Woodes Roger’s arrival in 1718 and the restoration of law and 
order over the Bahamas. The HMS Rose and HMS Squirrel were posted in Boston, the 
HMS Phoenix was posted in New York, and the HMS Lyme and HMS Shoreham were 
posted off the Virginia Capes.87 Rogers also brought with him to the Caribbean and 
eastern seaboard a general pardon issued by the King for any crime committed prior to 
January 5, 1718. Along with the pardon, he issued a bounty for any pirate refusing to 
accept the offer. The offer was eventually accepted by over 200 of 500 pirates in the 
Bahamas.88 The loss of the Bahamas as a safe haven accelerated the decline in piracy in 
the region. So did the governor of Jamaica’s commissioning of 10 ships to hunt for 
pirates. One of these ships, the Tyger, commanded by Jonathan Barnet, captured Calico 
Jack Rackham in 1720, together with the two female pirates Anne Bonney and Mary 
Read. Rackham was executed in 1720.89 Maritime counter-piracy was to increase in 
intensity and effectiveness in the years between 1717 and 1725 as we saw in the previous 
section. 
3. Poverty 
The end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713, and the increased importance 
of trade shifted the colonial powers’ focus. Trade, and protection of trade routes and 
colonies, became a major focus for Europe’s navies. Increased stability in Europe initially 
led to a reduction in the size of the British Royal Navy. A total of approximately 36,000 
sailors were discharged. This represented nearly 75 percent of the British wartime 
complement, and may have contributed to the increase in recruitment of pirate crews in 
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the Caribbean.90 However, ten years after the end of the War of Spanish Succession, the 
British grew their navy again to improve its ability to govern an increasing number of 
colonies both in the Caribbean and in Asia.91 
There is little evidence to support a causal relationship between poverty and the 
rise and existence of piracy in the Caribbean during this time. At best, the relative 
poverty of European populations led to a large pool of potential crew members for pirate 
vessels. A significant number of influential pirates were former British naval officers and 
noblemen. Also, local institutions in the colonies were in place, but as a result of weak 
central governance, these institutions were vulnerable to extortion, threats and 
corruption.92 As a consequence, local institutions were easily controlled by criminals and 
the colonies served as safe havens for pirates for nearly five decades.93  
One could assume that poverty would lead to populations throughout the 
Caribbean being vulnerable to corruption. However, there are ample indicators that the 
Caribbean and American colonies had thriving economies, and that the existing 
corruption was a result of opportunistic officials and pirates who were aware of the slim 
possibilities of arrest and prosecution.94 Apart from the Caribbean slaves, the general 
populations of the colonies were relatively well off.95 Slaves, meanwhile, rarely joined 
pirates to gain wealth, but rather to regain their lost freedom. Piracy in the Caribbean, it 
seems, was a result of opportunity rather than a result of poverty. The lack of governance 
and risk, combined with the prospect of enormous wealth, seem to have driven the rise in 
piracy throughout the Caribbean.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Land-based governance or lack thereof created permissive conditions for piracy in 
the 16th and 17th centuries. The lack of provision of governance, the lack of oversight, 
and the lack of maritime governance in the Caribbean led to an environment exploitable 
by pirates. Initially, privateering sanctioned with letters of marque from the various 
colonial powers of the region contributed to a growth in “legal piracy.” Also, local 
institutions in the colonies were in place, but as a result of weak central governance, these 
institutions were vulnerable to extortion, threats, and corruption. As a consequence, local 
institutions could be coopted by criminals and the colonies could serve as safe havens for 
pirates for nearly five decades. 
It took 50 years before land-based governance was sufficiently strengthened and 
changes in jurisdiction, removal of corrupt officials, and the establishment of Colonial 
Admiralty courts effectuated the end of piracy in the Caribbean. Captured pirates had to 
be quickly brought to justice and their punishment needed to be harsh. Approximately 
500–600 pirates were executed within a 10-year period, effectively deterring others from 
wanting to join them. Increased land-based governance, in turn, eventually turned the 
populations against the pirates, making formerly safe havens uninhabitable for pirates and 
removing the once prosperous markets for their loot.96 The arrival of Woodes Rogers in 
1718 introduced a more robust maritime military presence, which was also central. 
Rogers and greater numbers of British naval ships hunted the pirates at sea and targeted 
their safe havens on shore. The combined effects of letters of pardon and threats of 
capital punishment effectively decimated the pirates. Pirates who did not surrender were 
hunted and captured or killed. 
Poverty cannot explain the rise and existence of piracy in the Caribbean. What 
best explains its demise is a stronger focus on land-based governance with an increased 
military presence, and the ability to extend governance into international waters.  
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III. SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE STRAIT OF MALACCA 
 
Figure 2.   Strait of Malacca97 (From: Wikipedia, 2011) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Decolonization of Asia after World War II (WWII) sparked conflicts and political 
unrest, and provided opportune growing conditions for a new and modern era of piracy. 
The colonization of Asia had changed local borders, social systems, and governments. As 
a result, the effects of decolonization in Asia after 1945 led to significant changes in 
terms of stability and security. Although piracy as a phenomenon has existed in Asia for 
centuries, decolonization led to an increase in internal disputes and a decrease in 
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government control over large swaths of territory. In particular, the narrow Strait of 
Malacca provided the pirates with an opportunity to prosper at a very low risk.98 
B. BACKGROUND 
The lack of development and the increase in international trade throughout the 
1990s sparked an increase in piracy throughout Southeast Asia. Approximately 80% of 
the world’s trade is transported by sea, and more than 46,000 merchant vessels travel the 
seas world-wide.99 China’s economy has grown significantly. Throughout the 1990s the 
country’s economy increased by nearly 500%.100 The increased trade led to an increase in 
piracy throughout Southeast Asia, and particularly in the Strait of Malacca. 
The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most trafficked maritime chokepoints. 
More than 50,000 ships pass the strait annually. This represents close to 25% of the 
world’s shipping.101 Nearly 10.3 million barrels of oil pass the strait daily, representing 
almost all of the oil supplies for Japan, China and South Korea.102 Also, 80,000 people 
cross the strait on a daily basis and approximately 10,000 fishing vessels operate in its 
resource-rich waters every day.103 
In order to look closer at piracy in Southeast Asia, it might be useful to include 
the extension of the Strait of Malacca, the Phillip Channel and the Singapore Strait, since 
much of the traffic through the strait continues through these passages as well. Also, the 
entire passage falls within the jurisdiction of the same three nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore.  
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One of the earliest reported modern-day attacks in the region occurred in 1981. 
The attack on a Liberian-registered tanker in the extension of the Strait of Malacca 
known as the Philip Channel ushered in a new era of piracy. Throughout 1981, and 
following the initial attack, Indonesian pirates attacked a total of 21 vessels passing 
through the strait. Numerous attacks were also launched against anchored vessels. 
However, as these were within Singapore’s territorial waters, the attacks were labeled 
armed robbery and not acts of piracy. The main goal of these pioneers was to steal 
property and money.104 Piracy was on the rise, and throughout the 1990s Southeast Asian 
pirates pirated an average of 99 vessels annually.105 However, as the pirates became more 
organized, so did the sophistication of their attacks. Violence against ship crews rose, and 
piracy developed into hostage-taking and theft of ships and cargoes. Long-term 
operations became more normal. Long-term operations meant a transition from more 
rudimentary attacks on ships to steal money and valuables to capture of ships with the 
intent of selling the cargo and demanding ransom for hostages. Long-term operations are 
significant inasmuch as they are signs of better organized, funded, and equipped 
pirates.106  
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Location:  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000
SE Asia                               
Indonesia  55       22 33 57 47 60  115  119
Malacca 
Strait  32  7  5 3 2 3 0 1  2  75
Malaysia  1  2  0 4 5 5 4 10  18  21
Singapore 
straits  0  0  0 3 2 2 5 1  14  5
                             
Sum  88  9  5 32 42 67 56 72  149  220
Figure 3.   Location of actual and attempted piracy attacks in/around the Malacca 
Strait 1991–2000107 
In August 1991, the Sprintstar was seized by 25 pirates. One crew member was 
killed during the operation and the cargo worth approximately $3 million was transferred 
to another ship and sold. In 1992, the Far Trader was captured and diverted to Thailand. 
The ship’s cargo worth approximately $7 million was transferred to another vessel and 
disappeared. These two acts of piracy initiated a new trend of long-term ship seizures. 
Nine more long-term seizures were to follow in the years between 1994 and 1997.108 In 
April 1998, the tanker Petro Ranger was hijacked east of Malaysia with a cargo worth 
$1.5 million. The ship’s name was altered and the ship’s cargo was transferred to smaller 
vessels, brought to Hainan Island and sold. The crew was eventually arrested by the 
Chinese and deported to Indonesia to be released. 
Between 2001 and 2005, 22 attacks occurred. The focus had shifted towards 
smaller vessels with cargoes easy to sell. However, the focus was to change again with 
the capture of the Japanese tug Idaten in March 2005. The Idaten was towing a barge 
with 154 persons on board. Three crew members of the Idaten were taken hostage and 
released for a ransom after five days. The seizure of the Idaten’s crew together with 
another similar hijacking and hostage taking one month prior marked a change from 
robbery of vessels towards hostage taking for ransom. Previously, the seizure of the 
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Indonesian tanker the Tirta Niaga IV in the northern Strait of Malacca in 2001 had been 
an exception. However, the attacks in 2005 began a focused trend of holding crews for 
ransom.109 
The Strait of Malacca saw a surge in kidnapping for ransom in the following 
years. In 2002, five kidnappings took place followed by four in 2004. However, in 2005 
it rose to 14 kidnappings and eight attempts, and violence increased following this new 
trend in piracy. In January 2004, the Cherry 201 was hijacked in the Strait of Malacca. 
The ransom demand was $47,000. However, during negotiations for the release of 
hostages the pirates lost their patience and killed four crewmembers. The rest of the crew 
jumped ship and escaped, but the increased use of violence was demonstrated.110 
Since numerous acts of piracy were conducted within the territorial waters of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, official statistics suffer from an under-reporting of 
the total number of actual piracy attacks. An estimated number of 12 fishing vessels 
annually have been boarded by Indonesian pirates within the last 5 years, and the average 
ransom has risen from approximately $8,000 to $27,000 during the same period. In 
addition, Indonesian officials have been reported to demand as much as $27,000 more to 
release captured vessels back to the owners.111 
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Location:  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  2009  2010
SE Asia                            
Indonesia  103  121 94 79 50 43 28  15  40
Malacca Strait  16  28 38 12 11 7 2  2  2
Malaysia  14  5 9 3 10 9 10  16  18
Singapore straits  5  2 8 7 5 3 6  9  3
                             
Sum  138  156 149 101 76 62 46  42  63
Figure 4.   Location of actual and attempted piracy attacks in/around the Malacca 
Strait 2002-2010112   
Southeast Asia experienced a peak in piracy during 2003 and 2004. During these 
two years, Southeast Asian piracy accounted for almost 47% of the world’s reported 
pirate attacks. Although the overall risk of being attacked by pirates was as low as 
approximately 0.3%, the increased risk led to an increase in insurance premiums for the 
shipping industry, an increased focus on the issue, and threats of an international 
intervention in the Strait of Malacca. The international focus on the piracy problem 
increased the joint Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean maritime efforts to suppress 
piracy and regain control of the strait.113 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Land-based Governance 
To quote Martin N. Murphy: “failed states are not ungoverned spaces.”114 In 
Southeast Asia, countries with dysfunctional central governments developed into 
countries with a variety of regional governing institutions. These institutions typically 
were based on coalitions between power brokers of various kinds. A lack of presence 
from central governments caused a variety of smaller autonomous regions within the 
nation-states. A vacuum developed that local entities filled. These regional governments 
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controlled the police force, and survived by taxing local populations, and eventually 
turned to piracy as a means of livelihood.115 In the absence of functioning central 
governments, local governments provided various regions with basic services, thus 
increasing the distance between populations groups and the countries’ administrations.116  
Historically, the Southeast Asian states surrounding the Strait of Malacca have 
suffered from a series of deficiencies preventing effective counter-measures to stop 
piracy. Insurgencies and internal socio-political conditions have drawn focus away from 
combating criminal networks. In addition, lack of will or competence combined with 
corruption ensured a steady growth in criminal activities throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.117 This lack of national governance provided a growing network of pirate 
organizations with an abundance of safe havens to operate from. Indonesian territory 
includes some 17,500 islands, many of which are uninhabited. Also, the Indonesian 
coastline stretches over more than 34,000 miles with coves, creeks, rivers, and natural 
harbors from which pirates can operate.118 The Malaysian coastline stretches over more 
than 2,900 miles and with large areas that are scarcely or not inhabited. The geography of 
the region has benefitted the pirates for nearly thirty years in the absence of functioning 
governance institutions in the countries surrounding the Strait of Malacca.119 
On the transnational level, a lack of cooperation between the nations surrounding 
the Strait of Malacca created a situation further benefitting piracy.120 The sovereignty 
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issues between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have further delayed cooperation and 
provided growing conditions for piracy. Pirates attacking a vessel in Singapore have 
traditionally had an easy escape into the Riau Archipelago in Indonesia, avoiding capture 
and prosecution and at the same time using the territory to dispose of the booty. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was largely unsuccessful in stopping piracy from its inception in 1967, and 
into the early 1990s.121 However, the increased international focus on the piracy problem 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the threat of an international intervention in the 
region, led to a growing cooperation among the countries in the region. When piracy 
threatened Southeast Asian economies in 2004, and there was a real threat of an 
international intervention in the Strait of Malacca, ASEAN and an increased Southeast 
Asian cooperation was able to effectively counter the transnational issue of piracy in the 
region.122 
From 2005 to 2010, the number of pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca 
decreased from 38 to 2 (Figure 4). Increased national governance throughout the 
Southeast Asian countries, transnational cooperation in international waters combined 
with coordinated and common enforcement capacities and a common judicial policy 
towards piracy seems to have effectively served as a deterrent to pirates.123 However, the 
general piracy situation in Southeast Asia is still problematic. A growth in the security 
apparatus in the countries surrounding the Strait of Malacca has arguably led to better 
governance in these countries. Still, the size of the task of controlling the national 
territories seems out of reach for both Malaysia and Indonesia in the immediate future. 
Land-based governance is mainly limited to a trans-national agreement of prosecution 
and punishment of pirates. Limited efforts have been implemented to limit poverty in 
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more remote regions of both Malaysia and Indonesia in order to provide the populations 
with alternative incomes. However, what has limited piracy in the Strait of Malacca is 
likely an increase in maritime governance due to international pressure.124  
2. Maritime Governance 
During the 1990s the pirates gained access to modern equipment, and started to 
operate across regional borders and on a larger scale. By the end of the 1990s, nearly 
50% of the reported attacks worldwide occurred in the Strait of Malacca, the South China 
Sea, the sea north of Java, and in the waters surrounding the Sulu Archipelago.125 The 
number of reported attacks increased from 90 in 1994 to 445 in 2003.126 Of the attacks in 
2003, 156 occurred in Southeast Asia (Figure 4). 
Although a legal framework in international waters had been present for centuries, 
it was weak at best. In addition, law enforcement within a sovereign country’s territory 
has been left to the country’s naval law-enforcement agencies, and has traditionally been 
subject to its own laws.127 The definition of international waters has changed over time. 
Increased technological development and resource demand has led to increased claims of 
sovereignty from various littoral states to stretch beyond the traditional 3-mile limit.128  
With the United States challenging the established freedom of the seas doctrine in 
1945, other nations followed suit.129 South American states laid claim to a 200-mile zone 
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outside their territories, and a number of others laid claim to 12-mile territorial seas. 
These claims led to a common understanding that the old regime of territorial control 
needed revision. 
In 1958, 86 nations met in Geneva to establish new conventions for regulation of 
international and territorial waters. The convention solved some of the pressing matters 
but a number of issues were not settled. The result of the convention is commonly 
referred to as UNCLOS I.130 The unresolved issues remaining from UNCLOS I were 
renegotiated in 1960. These issues remained largely unresolved in what is referred to as 
UNCLOS II.131 After nine years of negotiations from 1973 to 1982, the UN resolution on 
the Law of the Sea was finalized and named UNCLOS.132 The agreement did not come 
into force until 1994 due to continued negotiations, and reluctance to sign by a number of 
nations. 
In Southeast Asia, ASEAN countries signed the UNCLOS in 1994. This 
coincided with a surge in pirate attacks in the region. Throughout the 1980s, piracy had 
grown at a steady pace. Combined with unresolved legal issues at sea, and political 
instability in the region, pirates benefitted from a lack of law enforcement, both in 
national and international waters.133 After the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, 
an increased focus on terrorism and possible links between terrorism and piracy led to 
increased efforts among the countries surrounding the Strait of Malacca to cooperate in 
combating transnational crime. As regional economies strengthened, and with a rise in  
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political stability, stronger and more capable governments proved ready to assume 
responsibility for regional stability, including the international waters in the Strait of 
Malacca.134 
Unilateral operations to stop piracy have been conducted by both Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Operasi Bajak (Operation Ending the Pirates) was undertaken in June 1992. 
The focus of the operation was on maritime patrolling and intelligence gathering 
primarily in the Riau Archipelago, Indonesia. A significant number of pirates were 
apprehended and prosecuted during the operation, and the region experienced a drop in 
piracy that lasted several years. For the remaining months of 1992, no attacks were 
reported. The effect lasted for two years with a total number of pirate attacks reduced to 
nine in 1992, and 5 in 1993 (Figure 3).135 
Piracy remained low until the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998, and the 
fall of Indonesian President Suharto. In 1999, the number of attacks in Indonesian waters 
nearly doubled to a total of 115. Attacks on transiting vessels increased from 11 to 49 
from 1998 to 1999, and attacks in the Strait of Malacca increased from 3 in 1998 to 91 in 
1999. This resurgence of piracy in the region eventually caused international concerns 
and subsequently an increase in counter-piracy funding and efforts in Southeast Asia. 
Maritime operations again led to a decrease in piracy for a short period. 
In 2003, a new resurgence of piracy finally led to an agreement among Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Singapore to conduct common operations to stop piracy (Operation 
MALSINDO). Joint patrolling was initiated in 2004, and the number of reported attacks 
in the Strait of Malacca dropped from 38 in 2004 to 12 in 2005. In the years following, 
the incidents dropped further to a total of 2 attacks reported in 2008. Until 2011, this 
trend has been stable due to an increase in trans-national cooperation in the region. 
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In 2005, Malaysia conducted unilateral operations to limit piracy. Armed 
personnel were placed as escorts on vessels through the Strait of Malacca, and Singapore 
assisted by initiating escort services in its territorial waters. However, these efforts were 
too limited, and needed to be sustained over time in order to have a lasting effect on 
piracy in the region.136 
Despite an incomplete legal framework for international waters, regional 
cooperation on maritime law enforcement did help control piracy in the Strait of Malacca. 
Initiated by the U.S. in 2004, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) was 
proposed as a piracy counter-measure in Southeast Asia. Both Indonesia and Malaysia 
refused to sign on to the plan.137 However, the threat of U.S. interference in the region 
did lead to increased regional cooperation, and in the years following 2004 a number of 
maritime countermeasures have been taken to control the piracy problem.  
After 16 Asian countries signed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) radars were 
established to monitor the Strait of Malacca in 2005, and the Maritime Enforcement 
Agency was created, piracy decreased significantly. The ReCAAP serves as an 
information sharing hub receiving information from the region’s navies and coast guards 
and disseminates the information to the participants.  
The Eye in the Sky program (EiS) serves to further deter pirates in the region. EiS 
is an agreement between Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand; each nation 
contributes two airplanes to a joint maritime air patrol operation over the Strait of 
Malacca.138 The 38 attacks in 2004 were reduced to 2 attacks in 2011. Still, a weak legal 
framework in international waters, combined with political instability, and state 
weaknesses in Indonesia and Malaysia, remain factors that influence the growth and 
existence of piracy.  
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Increased maritime governance in the Strait of Malacca has at least temporarily 
stopped piracy. Attacks in Southeast Asia have declined from 158 in 2004 to a total of 47 
in 2008 and the numbers seem to have stabilized around 50 attacks annually. Better 
training, better surveillance, and increased cooperation have proven effective tools 
against the pirate networks. However, as statistics indicate, the lack of land-based 
governance in the countries surrounding the Strait of Malacca has not resulted in a 
decisive removal of sanctuaries and safe havens on shore. The ebb and flow in pirate 
attacks suggest that maritime interventions have an effect. However, unless the level of 
governance is upheld, piracy is likely to recur if the maritime presence declines. The 
decline in piracy in Southeast Asia in 1992 followed Indonesia’s unilateral campaign. 
When the level of maritime governance decreased during the Asian economic crisis in 
1997–1998, the number of attacks increased. Finally, as a result of increased cooperation 
and a unilateral campaign by Malaysia in 2005, the number of attacks declined again. It is 
likely that the problem will only stay subdued as long as maritime patrolling continues. 
Therefore, it is also safe to assume that a decrease in maritime governance can relatively 
quickly lead to a resurgence of piracy, as long as the issue of land-based governance is 
not addressed. 
3. Poverty 
During the 1980s, as Southeast Asia experienced significant economic growth, the 
island of Batam, about 9 miles south of Singapore, experienced an influx of Indonesians. 
The immigrants were largely looking for jobs during the boom. Thus, when the economic 
crisis hit in the late 1990s, the island experienced a formidable increase in the 
unemployment rate. Many of the jobless islanders had to resort to crime in order to  
 
survive.139 With Batam’s location so close to Singapore, as well as the extension of the 
Strait of Malacca, the island quickly became a major stronghold for pirates in the region. 
The lack of both maritime and land-based governance on the island allowed the 
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population to turn to the crime that yielded the highest profit with the lowest risk. As a 
result, piracy grew into a major regional problem. 
The northern Strait of Malacca experienced a similar growth in piracy. However, 
the background story there is different. Long-lasting insurgencies in the Indonesian 
province of Aceh led to lawlessness and instability in the region. The instability and 
conflicts contributed to a profound poverty problem and, as a result, an increase in crime. 
Smuggling of weapons, drugs, people, and piracy have become alternative sources of 
income for the people and the insurgents. Also, the fall of Indonesian president Suharto in 
1998 introduced new political instability, fueling the already growing poverty problem. 
As a result, piracy grew from 3 attacks in 1998 to 91 in 2000. 
Despite significant growth in piracy throughout Southeast Asia, coinciding with 
general economic decline and increased levels of poverty in 1998, the ebb and flow of 
piracy seems to have especially tracked the varying levels of stability and governance in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Poverty undoubtedly played a role in combination with a general 
lack of governance. However, poverty as a main cause for piracy seems questionable. 
The need for coordination, weapons, expertise and larger boats to be able to engage in 
piracy operations suggests that poverty has little to do with the growth and existence of 
piracy.140  
D. CONCLUSION 
Piracy is both a national and a regional problem. Initially, efforts to stop piracy in 
Southeast Asia and in the Strait of Malacca were hindered by distrust and territorial 
disputes among the nations surrounding the strait.  
Current operations throughout Southeast Asia are not designed to increase land-
based governance in the region. The task of extending central governance throughout the 
region, especially by Indonesia and Malaysia with their long coastlines, relatively scarce 
financial and technological capabilities, and numerous islands, further adds to the already 
difficult governing challenges they face. Therefore, it is likely that the safe havens on 
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shore that have harbored pirates for decades will continue to serve as relatively safe 
sanctuaries for a variety of criminals. Also, it seems likely that these sanctuaries will 
serve as operating bases for pirates whenever renewed instability or regional political 
disagreement leads to a decline in maritime countermeasures. 
An increased focus on maritime governance seems to have helped quell piracy in 
the Strait of Malacca. However, in order for the effect to continue, a continuous and 
possibly even stronger maritime military presence is needed. The current strategy does 
not address the real issue at hand: access to land-based sanctuaries and safe havens. 
Therefore, permanent success in countering piracy is likely to depend on either a 
continued maritime presence, or on addressing the main problem of land-based 
governance. 
Levels of piracy in the Strait of Malacca have varied in concert with the degree of 
naval presence and focus on the issue. The fact remains that acts of piracy reemerge 
whenever the naval presence shrinks. This supports the point that in order for a campaign 
to be successful, the issues connected to a lack of land-based governance in the relatively 
weak states surrounding the strait, in particular Indonesia and Malaysia, must be 
addressed. Until the pirates are deprived of their shore-based sanctuaries, piracy will 
continue to reemerge whenever less attention is paid to maintaining a robust maritime 
military presence. 
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IV. SOMALIA: THE GREATER GULF OF ADEN 
 
Figure 5.   Gulf of Aden. Piracy 2005–2011141 (From: Geopolicity, 2011) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the first decade of the 21st century, Somalia has emerged as the world’s 
modern pirate hotspot. Political turmoil, numerous safe havens, a vulnerable population, 
and a long coastline are factors that have contributed to the growth and existence of 
piracy off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Aden, and in the Indian Ocean. Since 2006, 
piracy off the coast of Somalia has increased at an annual rate of approximately 100 per 
cent.142 
                                                 
141 Geopolicity, “The Economics of Piracy: Pirate Ransoms & Livelihoods off the Coast of Somalia,” 
Geopolicity Inc., May 2011,  4. 
142 “2009 Annual IMB Piracy Report,” International Maritime Bureau, 11 January 2010. 
 44
B. BACKGROUND 
Somalia has a coastline of 1,880 miles with close proximity to the Gulf of Aden 
and the approximately 20,000 ships passing along the main sea lanes between Europe, 
Africa, and Asia. Between 7 and 12 per cent of the world’s annual oil production passes 
through the Gulf of Aden, providing Somali pirates with an abundance of high-value 
targets.143 The strategically beneficial position of Somalia enables the pirate networks to 
launch attacks throughout the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. 
Piracy was not a significant problem in Somalia prior to 1989. A systematic 
piracy incident reporting regime was established by the IMB in 1991. However, 
according to Roger Villar, Southeast Asia and West Africa were overrepresented in the 
piracy statistics of the 1960s and 1970s. Also, of 400 attacks worldwide in the period 
between 1980 and 1984, none were reported to have taken place off the coast of 
Somalia.144 In the period between 1985 and 1991, only 6 attacks were recorded and four 
of these attacks were conducted by the Somali National Movement (SNM) to resupply its 
forces in the ongoing civil war.145 
In the late 1980s, as the Cold War drew to a close, Somalia’s strategic importance 
diminished. The resulting withdrawal of U.S. support further weakened the already 
failing regime of General Siad Barre. In the years between 1989 and 1991, the regime 
became increasingly totalitarian, and resistance groups, encouraged by the weakness of 
the regime, sprang up.146 Throughout the 1990s, the annual number of pirate attacks off 
the coast of Somalia ranged from none to approximately ten. Mohamed Siad Barre’s 
regime collapsed in 1991. The collapse led to the Somali Civil War and destruction of 
infrastructure. Economic and technological development stopped, and the country 
                                                 
143 Brian Wilson and James Kraska, “Anti-Piracy Patrols Presage Rising Naval Powers,” Yale Global, 
13 January 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11808 (accessed 9 May 2012). 
144 Roger Villar, Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980 (London: Conway Maritime 
Press, 1985),  10. 
145 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Resource Program, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pirates.htm.  
146 Central Intelligence Agency, “Somalia,” The 2012 World Fact BookWashington, DC: Office of 
Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/so.html (accessed 9 May 2012). 
 45
resorted to informal judicial systems in efforts to restore law and order.147 In the years 
from 1991 and 2011, 14 transitional governments have attempted to rule the collapsed 
country without success. As a result, piracy and particularly kidnapping of ships and their 
crews for ransom has increased at a steady pace.  
The capture of trawlers and smaller commercial ships had been used as a means to 
acquire larger and more capable vessels.148 In September 1994, pirates attacked MV 
Bonsella north of Caluula. The main reason for the attack was to seize a larger and more 
capable ship. Initially however, illegal fishing and entry into Somali territorial waters was 
used as an excuse for illegal ship boarding and attacks. In 1998, a Syrian ship and a 
Bulgarian freighter were captured, allegedly for illegally transiting Somali waters, and 
only released after the payment of a $110,000 ransom.149 Also, a Kenyan ship was 
captured off the coast of Eyl for illegal fishing and released after payment of a $500,000 
fine.150 
Although piracy occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the rate was 
relatively low. In 2000, 23 attacks were reported, and with the increased naval presence 
of Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150) in 2001, the attacks further decreased. In 2002, 
the pirates added hijacking and hostage-taking to more straightforward robberies.151 In 
June 2002, the Cypriot vessel Aamir was seized while at anchor off the coast of Puntland. 
The ship was released for a ransom of $400,000. The same month, a North Korean ship 
was captured and subsequently released for a $300,000 ransom.152 The IMB issued a 
warning that the risk of being attacked in Somalia was increased from probable to certain; 
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thus, the IMB recommended ships to remain at least 100 miles off shore. Pirate attacks 
decreased from 21 attacks in 2003 to 10 attacks in 2004.153 
Increased international presence due to a tsunami-related famine in Somalia in 
2004 led to an increase in piracy in 2005. In June 2005, the MV Semlow was attacked and 
captured enroute to Boosaso, Somalia with food supplies. The ship was the 20th victim of 
2005, and was robbed and brought to Ceel Huur to await ransom negotiations. During the 
ransom negotiations, the MV Semlow was utilized to seize another ship, the MS Ibn 
Batuta, an Egyptian cement carrier. Both ships were eventually released for $135,000 in 
ransom.154 From 2004 to 2005, the total number of attacks off the coast of Somalia and in 
the Gulf of Aden increased from 10 to 45. In October alone, the MV Torgelow, the MV 
Miltzow, and the MV Pagonia were captured and eventually released for a ransom of 
$700,000.155 
A connection has been established between the 2004 tsunami originating from an 
earthquake off the island of Sumatra, and the rise in piracy in 2005. The devastation of 
Somali coastal communities led to a humanitarian crisis. 289 people died, and 44,000 
were left in urgent need of food, drinking water, healthcare, and shelter. Political, 
economic and security issues further worsened, and in 2005, the number of attacks off the 
coast of Somalia increased from 10 to 45.156  
Allegations of toxic waste dumping and illegal fishing off the Somali coast 
provided additional legitimacy to the pirates. The Somali population generally supported 
piracy as a means to protect Somali waters, and saw the ransom money as compensation 
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for years of exploitation by foreign nations. Thus, piracy continued to grow throughout 
the 1990s with a large degree of popular support.157 
Although piracy off the coast of Somalia has existed for decades, the real surge 
appeared in 2008. From 44 attacks reported in 2007, piracy increased to 111 attacks in 
2008. Also, piracy was no longer confined to the Somali coastline. The attacks occurred 
both along the Somali coast, in the Gulf of Aden, and in the Red Sea. The lucrative 
business of piracy offered the traditional fishermen of Somalia incomes nearly ten times 
higher than from the fishing industry.158 In 2008, the total estimated income from 
ransoms was $150 million.159 During 2007 alone, the total number of hostages taken 
increased from 177 to 815. 160 
 
Location:  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Sum: 
East Africa                            
Gulf of 
Aden/Red Sea  18  8 10 10 13 92 132  78  361
Somalia  3  2 35 10 31 19 80  139  319
                             
Sum  21  10 45 20 44 111 212  217  680
Figure 6.   Location of actual and attempted piracy attacks off the coast of 
Somalia from 2003 to 2010.161  
Somali pirates have increased their capabilities at a steady pace. The initial pirates 
operated out of small boats and close to shore. However, as ships avoided the Somali  
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coastline, the pirates acquired larger, ocean-capable vessels and ventured farther out in 
the Indian Ocean. The proof of the pirates’ increased capabilities came with the capture 
of the Sirius Star. The tanker was taken approximately 420 nautical miles or close to 780 
kilometers off the coast of Somalia.162  
During 2006, piracy decreased again to a total number of 20 attacks. However, 
this was to increase to 44 attacks in 2007, and further increase in 2008 to a total of 111 
ships attacked, with 44 successfully captured, and a total of $30-$80 million in ransom 
payments.163 Despite the military campaign launched in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, piracy 
continued to grow to 212 attacks in 2009, and 217 in 2010. In 2011, the number of 
attacks further increased to 275. Today, military patrolling efforts seem to have decreased 
the number of attacks. By April 2012, 27 pirate attacks have been reported. The question 
is whether this is a result of an increased military presence or merely a sign of another 
change in the pirates’ tactics.164 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Land-based Governance 
Somalia had depended largely on foreign aid until the collapse of Barre’s regime 
in 1991. With the worsened security situation caused by factional violence, the U.S.-led 
UN contingent providing humanitarian aid left Somalia after the 1993 incident in 
Mogadishu that led to the killing of 18 U.S. servicemen.165 Since 1991, Somalia has 
lacked a functioning government and has been ruled by clan-based warlords, the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU), and a total number of 14 transitional governments. The first 
Transitional Federal Government was established in Kenya in 2004, and led by President 
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Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. However, in 2006 the ICU assumed control over Mogadishu 
thus provoking a military intervention by the U.S. and Ethiopia. With the help of U.S. 
and Ethiopian troops, President Yusuf took control over Mogadishu. His presence, 
however, did little to improve governance in Somalia. In fact, the only visible result of 
Yusuf’s arrival in Mogadishu was the rise of an insurgency throughout the country that is 
still ongoing.166 The insurgency has thus far claimed more than 10,000 lives since 2006, 
and attacks on aid convoys have claimed lives and hampered international efforts to 
address intermittent famines in Somalia.167 
The political turmoil and lack of governance throughout Somalia led to the killing 
of 20 aid workers in 2008, resulting in international withdrawal and a worsening of the 
humanitarian and governance situation in the country. This, in turn, benefitted the pirate 
networks along the Somali coast. In the absence of proper governing institutions and 
commerce, coastal societies, especially along the Puntland coast, have grown 
increasingly dependent on income related to piracy. The towns of Eyl, Hoboyo and 
Xaradheere in Puntland, all well-known pirate safe havens, prosper due to piracy. Piracy 
has led to interdependency between these communities and the pirate organizations. 
Populations that prosper from piracy provide logistical support and safe havens to the 
pirates in return. Analysts have suggested that the Puntland government is party to the 
piracy networks, and that the pirates have taken control over local governing 
institutions.168 Pirates are reported to provide for the poor in the coastal societies, thereby 
securing local support. The pirate networks have seemingly taken over provision of basic 
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services to the coastal populations in direct opposition to the Somali government and are 
referred to as “saviors of the sea” and not pirates.169 
Piracy is dependent on the level of governance exercised in Somalia. In 2006, the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) assumed control over Mogadishu. In the months following 
the Islamic takeover in Somalia, a number of pirate safe havens along the coast were 
closed down. As a result, the piracy statistics for 2006 show only 20 attacks off the coast 
of Somalia.170 The result, however, was short lived. In 2007, after U.S. and Ethiopian 
troops ousted the ICU government, the attacks were up to a total of 44 again. 
Local support for the pirates is largely ensured through bribery. This point is 
underscored by the capture of the French yacht Le Ponant in April 2008. The yacht was 
brought to port in Garaad after its capture. On arrival, locals assisted in guarding the 
vessel and also provided logistical support for the pirates. In return for their support, each 
villager was promised a reward of $50. Of the total ransom demand of $2 million, the 
pirates were promised $11,000–$20,000.171 In comparison, an average Somali citizen can 
expect a lifetime income of approximately $14,500.172 Considering the low risk of 
hijacking the vessel and the potential size of the ransom, popular support for the pirates is 
likely to continue in the absence of a functioning state in Somalia. 
Attempts have been made to increase the level of land-based governance and thus 
decrease the risk of piracy in Somalia. Pirates have been captured in their safe havens on 
shore. However, the number of attacks on pirates, and the resulting arrests have proven 
insufficient to stop the lucrative and booming business. Also, the lack of a functioning 
Somali state makes the movement of ransom money through informal money transfer 
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systems, bribery of officials, and coercion of local institutions a low-risk activity. An in-
depth research on the economics of Somali piracy published by Geopolicity in May 2011 
outlines the approximate revenue for the various parts of the pirate value chain. 
According to its conclusion approximately 70 per cent of the revenues from piracy go to 
land-based actors. These actors are financers, sponsors, Somali officials, and families of 
pirates or supporters. In the absence of effective state governance and law enforcement, 
pirates have assumed control over local institutions through bribery and coercion. Also, 
the lack of a government presence throughout Somalia has facilitated the growth of an 
increasingly well-organized and trans-national organization of piracy. Politicians, Somali 
diaspora, law enforcement officials, and money launderers are involved in the piracy 
trade, and unless functioning governance over Somali territory is established, the 
projected increase in piracy could reach more than 600 incidents globally by 2015, with 
approximately 50 per cent of the attacks occurring off the coast of Somalia.173 
2. Maritime Governance 
“Piracy and other transnational threats are not results of contemporary 
globalization. These activities have occurred throughout history. However, globalization 
has increased the range and effects of these activities insofar as it has provided the 
physical means to cover increasing distances and to cross national borders. Also, 
globalization has increased the impact of piracy on world trade.”174 The lack of maritime 
governance in Somalia led to an external military intervention in 2008. However, the 
increased military presence and the continued growth in pirate attacks suggest that a 
maritime intervention cannot yield sufficient results on its own. The current intervention 
has led to a spreading and increase of piracy instead of stopping or limiting the 
activity.175 
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Somali pirates claim to be members of the Somali Coast Guard, patrolling 
territorial waters in an attempt to stop illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic wastes. 
This argument resonates well with the Somali population.176 UN reports confirm that 
more than 700 illegal fishing vessels were extracting approximately $300 million worth 
of fish from Somali waters in 2005.177 However, since 2005 the pirates have grown 
increasingly sophisticated and operations are expanded out of Somali territorial waters as 
far as 420 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean.178 
 In the absence of Somali naval assets, U.S. naval vessels increased their counter- 
piracy efforts in 2006 in an attempt to stop the pirate activity. In January 2006, the USS 
Winston Churchill captured the dhow Al Bisarat, arrested a crew of 10 pirates, and 
confiscated their weapons. The pirates were brought to Kenya for prosecution and 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment.179 In March 2006, the USS Gonzales and the 
USS Cape St. George were fired upon by rocket propelled grenades (RPG) from a pirate 
vessel. Both ships engaged the attacking vessel, resulting in the killing of one pirate and 
the arrest of seven others.180 The increased military activity seemingly had an effect on 
piracy, and the number of attacks in 2006 dropped to 20 from 45 in 2005.181 However, 
the effect did not last long, and in 2007, the attacks bounced back to a total of 44.182  
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Also, the assault to free the American-flagged vessel Maersk Alabama by U.S. SEALs in 
April 2009 sent a strong warning to Somali pirates. Three pirates were killed and the 
ship’s crew released.183  
 Despite increasingly violent attacks on pirates from the coalition forces patrolling 
off the coast of Somalia, the desired reduction of pirate attacks has not occurred. 
Currently, the European Union Naval Forces run Operation Atalanta to counter piracy in 
the GoA. The EU operation features 11 naval vessels and four aircraft. In addition, the 
U.S., India, Pakistan, Korea, and China have patrolled the area. However, with the Indian 
Ocean covering 1 million square miles and the Somali coast stretching over 1,880 miles, 
the task of stopping piracy by maritime means remain formidable. Although piracy 
attacks seemed to decrease in the first half of 2012, a maritime approach to stop the 
piracy problem seems unrealistic as the lack of land-based governance, popular support, 
and safe havens on shore remain unaltered. 
3. Poverty 
Before 1991, Mogadishu was Somalia’s industrial center. Even though production 
rates were relatively low, the area surrounding the capital had bottling plants, factories 
producing spaghetti, cigarettes, matches, and boats. There was a petroleum refinery, and 
in Kismaayo there were a meat-tinning factory, a tannery, and a modern fish factory. 
Somalia had two sugar refineries, one near Jilib on the lower reach of the Jubba and one 
at Jawhar (Giohar) on the middle reach of the Shabeelle.184 The industry was largely 
destroyed during the Somali civil war fought between the two clan-based warlords, 
Muhammad Farah Aydid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), and Ali Mahdi 
Muhammad of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). These two factions battled with Siad 
Barre’s clan militia, the Somali National Front (SNF), over control of the southern 
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Somali territory. The civil war devastated the grain producing region of Somalia, and led 
to a famine throughout southern Somalia.185 
Political turmoil, the ousting of the ICU and subsequent takeover by the TFG and 
President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed in 2006 did little to improve the poverty situation in 
Somalia. Since 2006, poverty, clan wars, and famine have continued to haunt the country. 
Approximately 10,000 people have been killed since 2006, and more than 1 million have 
been internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries. An estimated 7 million people 
were said to be on the verge of famine in July 2006, and again in the summer of 2008.186 
Continuous efforts from the World Food Program (WFP) have not yielded positive 
results. Repeated violent attacks on food convoys have made the provision of foreign aid 
increasingly difficult, and have effectively caused increased famine and poverty. The 
estimated GDP/capita in Somalia has remained low, at approximately $500 annually, and 
the estimated income for a Somali over an average working lifetime of 29 years is 
$14,500.187 The situation has subsequently led to a booming business in piracy. 
Although piracy in Somalia has been linked to poverty, there are indications that 
poverty alone may not be the most obvious reason for the rising number of attacks. 
Arguably, piracy or armed robbery against ships in Somali waters may have increased as 
a result of increased poverty. However, the level of investment, planning and 
organization behind offshore attacks suggest otherwise. According to interviews with 
Somalis, approximately 50 per cent of the ransom money goes to the pirates themselves. 
External financiers and investors take 30 per cent of the booty and supporting villagers 
get 20 per cent. However, figures presented by Geopolicity suggest that 40-50% of the 
proceeds are transferred out of Somalia, and the remaining 50-60% is shared between the 
pirates and the land-based support network. Exact ransom figures are difficult to verify 
due to the extensive use of informal money transfer systems in Somalia. There is, 
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however, little doubt that the increased size of the ransoms has led to extreme wealth by 
Somali standards in several pirate havens along the Somali coast.188 Still, there are only 
an estimated 1,500 pirates, out of a population of approximately 10 million, operating in 
the country. 
The total estimated income for Somali pirates in 2010 was $75-$238 million.189 
According to estimates, between $32.5 million and $119 million were divided between 
1,500 individuals and their clans and families, creating a significant disparity between 
pirates and non-pirates.190 Arguably, one reason for piracy not spreading more is the 
control exercised by resourceful clan-based pirate networks, and a strong wish to keep the 
lucrative business and income among a few select clans and clan-families. Also, some 
analysts believe an increasing amount of money leaves Somalia without benefitting the 
population. Figures presented by Geopolicity indicate that approximately 40-50 per cent 
of the piracy proceeds are transferred to financers in the diaspora via informal money 
transfer systems.191 The amount of money transferred out of Somalia, the level of 
investment needed to plan and stage pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean, and the level of 
sophistication shown during ransom negotiations, suggest that poverty is merely an 
enabling factor added to the obvious lack of good central governance in Somalia. Also, if 
ransom money only benefits between 1,500 and 3,000 pirates, the general situation of 
Somali poverty seems to be of less importance than the opportunity presented by a lack 
of governance. What seems likely is that the ransom money has enabled the pirates to 
take control of local governing institutions, and to a great extent take over provision of 
basic services to populations in select areas along the Somali coast. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The growth of piracy in Somalia occurred after the fall of the Mohamed Siad 
Barre regime in 1991. The fall of the Barre regime led to political turmoil and removed 
the lid from a boiling pot of clan-based hatred and internal dispute among a variety of 
factions. As the turmoil continued, piracy not only increased, but spread further into the 
Indian Ocean. Puntland soon emerged as the preferred safe haven for the emerging pirate 
networks. 
In 2008, the piracy situation off the coast of Somalia had reached levels that 
called for an international reaction and naval forces were sent to the GoA and the Indian 
Ocean to limit or stop acts of piracy, and to provide a secure environment for passing 
ships. In the years following, piracy spread and increased throughout the Indian Ocean as 
far out as 600 miles from the Somali coast. The maritime intervention, it seems, did little 
to stop the attacks. 
A status quo of chaos dominates Somalia. Various transitional governments have 
done little to improve the chaotic situation, and government legitimacy throughout 
Somalia is non-existent, with the only exception being Somaliland in the north. Piracy 
thrives in this situation of political, social, and economic unrest. The lack of legal income 
sources and the absence of governance make piracy tempting as the risk of being 
prosecuted on land is minute. Piracy has rapidly changed from a vigilante coast guard 
into a “lucrative and highly organized illicit business.”192  
Somali poverty has arguably enabled pirate networks to bribe officials, recruit 
new pirates, and buy support in poor coastal villages. However, involvement of 
international actors, government officials, and money launderers suggest that poverty is 
not a main driving force behind piracy in Somalia. Powerbrokers with assets support the 
pirate networks with funding and technical equipment that permit the lucrative business 
to continue. In return for their investments, sponsors and financiers are believed to earn  
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approximately 50 percent of the piracy proceeds. In addition, a significant network of 
Somali expatriates backs the pirate business from their positions in Europe and North 
America.193 
Piracy in Somalia has rapidly grown into a trans-national problem. Pirates have 
ties to organizations and sponsors in Yemen, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, 
Europe, and North America.194 It follows that piracy in the GoA and the Indian Ocean is 
caused not by a lack of maritime governance or poverty, but by an abundance of safe 
havens and a lack of governance on shore. Somali piracy may be limited by an increased 
maritime presence. However, to achieve a permanent result, piracy will eventually have 
to be combated on shore. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Piracy and other transnational threats are not results of contemporary 
globalization. These activities have occurred throughout history. However, 
globalization has increased the range and effects of these activities insofar 
as it has provided the physical means to cover increasing distances and to 
cross national borders. Also, globalization has increased the impact of 
piracy on world trade.195  
Initially in the Caribbean, privateers were utilized to maintain territorial control. 
However, they were also used to extend the European wars during the 17th century. The 
use of privateers to enforce territorial control was also practiced in colonies in Southeast 
Asia. Somalia had a slightly different experience insofar as the privateers were largely 
self-organized. Still, common in all three cases has been the use of privateers within 
certain time frames to enforce territorial control. 
The ebb and flow of piracy has occurred as the result of varying levels of land-
based and maritime governance. Piracy during different periods may have started small. 
However, as governance decreased the level of organization and profit for pirates 
increased. In the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Somalia, pirates have taken advantage of 
local poverty to further their goal: increased financial wealth. Local support has been 
gained by bribery, coercion, and the promise of financial wealth. In the absence of 
governance, local institutions have been replaced by increasingly advanced and well-
organized pirate networks. 
Territories plagued by political and social unrest have historically been attractive 
to criminal networks. Also, the lack of viable income alternatives, combined with a lack 
of deterrence, has led to an increase in recruitment for these criminal networks. However, 
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poverty as a main reason for the growth and existence of piracy remain unlikely. Poverty 
has existed in coastal societies for decades without leading to piracy.196 
The lack of local institutions rather than the lack of a state could explain the rise 
in piracy over time and space. However, conditions in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and 
Somalia point towards a lack of central governance as the main reason for growth and 
existence of criminal pirate networks. Local institutions have been taken over by 
criminals benefitting from instability and a general lack of law and order. Piracy in the 
Caribbean was not decisively stopped until the pirates were denied sanctuaries on shore 
and the risk of prosecution and subsequent death penalties were increased to a certainty. 
This was achieved through an increase in maritime and land-based governance. Corrupt 
officials were replaced, and functioning central governance was reinstated. 
The current development around the Strait of Malacca has come as a result of 
regional cooperation. Although the levels of land-based governance in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore are significantly better than what exists in Somalia, piracy is 
controlled largely by maritime means. Unless the current military presence in the Strait is 
upheld, piracy is likely to recur as little is done to improve conditions on shore, and thus 
remove access to safe havens for the pirates. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
It is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to discuss the intervention 
strategy for the current anti-piracy operation in the GoA. However, it seems timely to 
suggest that the planners of the campaign have not taken historical facts into 
consideration when crafting the strategy. The result is a campaign directed at a part of the 
piracy problem: enforcement of maritime governance. 
According to Geopolicity, 70% of the pirate value chain is shore-based. By 
looking at three various cases of piracy, there are few indicators supporting elimination of 
pirates through increased maritime governance alone. The success of the Caribbean 
campaign lies in the political will to fight the pirates, with violence if necessary, on shore, 
                                                 
196 Emmanuel N. Sone, “Piracy In The Horn Of Africa: The  Role Of Somalia’s Fishermen,” Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
 61
in territorial waters, and in international waters. The pirates of the Caribbean were 
decimated because they were denied safe havens on shore.  
If poverty and relative deprivation were a root cause of piracy, one should expect 
a significantly larger number of attacks off the coast of, for example, India, a country 
with a profound poverty problem, a long coastline, and with proximity to main shipping 
routes. Also, a lack of local institutions does little to explain the causes for piracy. It is 
not the existence of these institutions or lack thereof that determine the level of piracy, 
rather who is in charge of them. In order to ensure functioning institutions, and territorial 
control, a high level of land-based governance and security is needed. One finding of this 
thesis is that piracy will grow and exist in areas with insufficient land-based governance. 
It follows that piracy can only be decisively combated by addressing the governance 
issue. 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia as well as in the Strait of Malacca could be 
decisively combatted. However, this would require an intervention aimed at maritime 
governance, with first and foremost a restoration of land-based governance. As long as 
the majority of pirated vessels are released after payment of ransom money, and as long 
as the problem remains little more than a nuisance to international trade, a large-scale 
intervention to stop piracy off the coast of Somalia remains unlikely. Stopping piracy 
would require a significant involvement from a number of nations and be targeted 
towards financiers, facilitators, governance in Somalia and, finally, maritime governance 
in the GoA. The political will to decisively curtail the piracy problem does not exist, and 
the current intervention is likely to continue as a means to please the shipping business. 
An intervention in Somalia would be costly both financially and in human lives and the 
situation is not severe enough to inspire a sufficient level of international cooperation. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Various theories have been posited to explain the decline of piracy in the 18th 
century. One theory is that the decline of piracy was caused by military campaigns 
directed towards the pirates, their ships, and their safe havens. Military campaigns were 
undoubtedly important in the campaign against the pirates of the 18th century. However, 
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these campaigns were supported by a significant increase in land-based governance. The 
means with which the pirates were fought increased the risks attached to piracy, and 
effectively deterred recruitment of new pirates.  
Arguably, the decline in the Spanish looting of the South American continent, and 
the increased trade with Asia in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries also resulted in a 
decline in possible targets in the Caribbean. However, parallel conditions led to the rise 
of modern piracy in the Strait of Malacca and in the greater Gulf of Aden. 
The rise of modern piracy is dominated by two schools of thought. One prominent 
theory is that the rise of modern piracy is caused by poverty and relative deprivation.197 
Another school of thought explains the growth of piracy as a result of weak local 
institutions rather than the lack of a state.198 The rise in modern piracy, both in East 
Africa and in Southeast Asia, suggests that poverty in itself has little bearing on the rise 
and fall of piracy anywhere. Instead, territorial governance depends on a functioning 
central government and remains the key to the rise and fall of piracy.  
The GoA is still troubled by the presence and activities of pirates. The entire coast 
of East Africa, with the exception of the South African territory, is either listed as “in 
danger” or “critical” on the Failed States Index 2011.199 The status of the states in the 
region, the size of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, combined with the size of failed 
or failing countries and their coastlines, makes counter-piracy in the region a formidable 
task. Also, since the current intervention is directed towards the lesser of two factors, a 
short-time solution to the problem remains unlikely. 
Arguably, a lasting solution to the current problem faced in the GoA can only be 
achieved through a massive collaboration involving large-scale improvement of central 
government in the countries surrounding the GoA. The important questions are whether 
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the problem is significant enough for Western countries to pay for long-time intervention 
aimed at improving regional governance, and whether such an intervention is worthwhile. 
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